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Abstract: The Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG) system is functioned as the last resort safety net for 
China’s urban poor people and plays a substantial role in poverty reduction. Over the past few years, 
reforms have been taken to increase the benefit levels and to provide minimum income protection for 
households which are most vulnerable to poverty. However, so far little is known about how the urban 
MLG system has developed across regions and how the regional differences have changed over time. 
Since the administration of the MLG system in China is decentralized, regional differences help us to 
understand the effectiveness of the MLG system in poverty alleviation. Therefore, this paper provides 
new empirical insights into the MLG development across 31 regions in urban China between 2003 and 
2013. In addition to the widely used indicators like benefit levels and number of benefit recipients, we 
construct the indicators of MLG replacement rates to measure the generosity of the benefits in relation 
to income from work. The results show that first, the development of the urban MLG system in China has 
followed different tracks before and after 2008. Since 2008, the governments have made great efforts to 
increase the generosity of the MLG system while put more stringent conditions on MLG beneficiaries. 
Consequently, the MLG standards increased significantly while MLG recipients decreased enormously. 
Second, the development of the urban MLG programs varies considerably across regions. However, 
China has shown convergence of the generosity levels of the MLG programs across regions since 2008. 
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1. Introduction 
The Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG, or Dibao) system provides a last income safety net for poor 
families’ sustenance.1 The aim of the benefit program is to ensure minimum living standard for poor and 
vulnerable households (Chen and Barrientos 2006). Provision of the benefits is based on need and is 
means-tested. In the presence of rising unemployment and inadequate social insurance benefits in China, 
MLG scheme has received increasing attention as a safeguard against low income and poverty (Shang 
and Wu 2004; Wu and Ramesh 2004). According to the “Twelfth Five-year Plan on the Civil Affairs 
Development”, the MLG standard was expected to be raised by 10 percent per year on average in urban 
areas of China and to reach 404.6 Chinese yuan (around 66.3 U.S. dollars) per person per month at the 
end of the year 2015 (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2011). This goal has been 
completed ahead of schedule. By the end of the year 2014, the urban MLG standard reached 411 yuan 
(around 72.3 U.S. dollars) per person per month (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China 2015).  
A large set of literature focuses on the emergence and development of the MLG system in China (e.g. 
Ngok 2010; Jiang 2013; Leung and Wong 1999; Leung 2003; Leung 2006; Saunders and Shang 2001; 
Shang and Wu 2004). Another set of studies put more attention to the adequacy of the benefit scheme 
(e.g. Du and Park 2007; Gao et al. 2009; Ravallion et al. 2006; Wang 2007). One general finding is that in 
spite of its rapid development and expansion, the MLG system is still far from effective in alleviating 
poverty (Gao and Zhai 2012; Ravallion et al. 2006). Nevertheless, the MLG system has played a 
substantial role in reducing poverty over the past few years (Wu and Ramesh 2014). The ineffectiveness 
of the system in alleviating poverty may come from two sources. First, the urban MLG system is 
distinguished from the rural MLG system. In urban areas, the MLG scheme is relatively generous and has 
become the major tool to help to urban poor out of poverty. However, the urban MLG system is only 
targeted at urban residents with their household registration (hukou) in the city of residence, whereas 
rural residents who have migrated to cities are excluded from the urban MLG system (Saunders and 
Shang 2001; Solinger 2005). The rural MLG system, on the other hand, is far less developed and is not 
fully established in many districts (Deng and Wu 2006). Consequently, a number of eligible families in 
rural areas and the migrants from rural to urban areas, which are actually most vulnerable in terms of 
poverty, are not covered by the MLG system (Wang 2007).  
                                                          
1 We follow Solinger and Hu (2012) to name the Dibao system as the “Minimum Livelihood Guarantee” system. 
Different authors use different names (see Gao 2006; Leung and Wong 1999). 
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Regional differences might also contribute to the ineffective MLG benefit system. In China, the 
administration and implementation of the MLG scheme in China is quite decentralized. Local 
governments are given the discretion to decide the MLG standards under which the poor people can 
apply for the benefits. Meanwhile, they have considerable scope to enact their own rules of governing 
the finance (Chen and Barrientos 2006). In some less developed regions, the governments usually do not 
have sufficient financial resources and are tempted to set MLG standards lower than what is needed to 
meet the households’ actual basic needs (Du and Park 2007; Solinger and Hu 2012). Even though many 
regions may set adequate MLG standards, there is no guarantee of effective enforcement. In some 
regions, especially in the west, the gap between the entitled MLG benefits and the benefits actually 
received by the recipients is large (Gao et al. 2009). Therefore, it is important to look at the regional 
difference to understand the development of the MLG system in urban China. However, so far empirical 
analyses are relatively rare that little is known about how the benefit schemes evolve across regions and 
how the cross regional variation has changed over time, especially in recent years. To make a 
contribution, this study aims to add empirical insights into the development of the urban MLG programs 
across 31 municipalities, provinces and autonomous regions over the period 2003-2013. As such, this 
study covers all regions ranging from the more developed eastern part to the less developed central and 
western part of China. The rural MLG system is not considered as the rural system was not extended to 
rural poor population nationwide until 2007.  
Second, we use the year 2008 as the mid-point. In 2008, the “Social Assistance Law (draft)” was 
published, indicating that the administration of the MLG system became fully legalized (Zhong 2011). 
After 2008, a series of MLG reforms were taken to increase the generosity of the benefits while specify 
the conditions to become eligible for the benefits. Splitting the period using the year 2008 also helps us 
to understand the impact of the global financial crisis on China’s MLG reforms. According to Liu (2009) 
and Zhang (2009), the global financial crisis caused an economic slowdown and a sharp fall in export 
growth in China, resulting in rising unemployment and social tensions and instability. The crisis brought 
needs for urgent reforms on the social safety net to maintain social stability. To the best of our 
understanding, there is no research exploring the different development paths before and after 2008. 
Moreover, we apply the relative convergence test (using the coefficient of variation) to analyze whether 
the regional differences have been narrowed in recent years.   
Third, in the comparative welfare state literature, indicators like total social expenditure, or 
programmatic expenditure have been widely used since they offer an alternative approach to measure 
the relative importance of the benefit program (Castles 2008). More recently, Wang and Van Vliet (2014) 
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construct minimum income replacement rates for comparison across 33 European Union (EU) countries 
and non-EU OECD countries over 1990-2009. With replacement rates, social assistance and minimum 
income benefits can be compared with other welfare programs such as unemployment benefits. In 
addition, income replacement rates allow us to measure the generosity of the social benefits in relation 
to work income. However, regarding the MLG system in China, existing studies mainly rely on the MLG 
standards (e.g. Shang and Wu 2004; Wu and Ramesh 2014). Instead, indicators on MLG expenditure and 
MLG replacement rates are rarely applied. Therefore, in addition to MLG benefit levels and MLG 
recipients, this study constructs indicators on MLG expenditure and MLG replacement rate across all of 
the 31 urban regions in China, covering the period from 2003 to 2013. As such, this study contributes to 
the comparative welfare literature on social assistance and minimum income benefits. MLG replacement 
rates in China were quite low compared to the other developed countries in general. The highest ratio of 
the MLG standard to average wage was found in Tianjin for single persons, which was 11.7 percent. This 
was much lower than the more developed European countries, for instance,  Luxembourg (45.1 percent, 
the highest in EU26) and a little bit higher than Estonia (11.0 percent, the lowest in EU26) (see Wang and 
Van Vliet 2014). All figures refer to the year 2009 (for comparison). 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the institutional characteristics of the 
Chinese urban MLG programs. Section 3 describes the data and measures used in the study. Empirical 
statistics are presented in section 4. In section 5 we do some convergence and correlation tests. Section 
6 concludes.  
2. MLG System in Urban China 
2.1 Welfare protection in China and the Emergence of Urban MLG Program 
Soon after its foundation in 1949, the People’s Republic of China adopted a universal lifelong 
employment policy to guarantee the job security of urban workers. Under the lifelong employment 
policy, urban workers would face no risks of unemployment over their working age. Meanwhile, the 
urban workers were provided with comprehensive welfare protection through the danwei system (work 
unit). The danweis included the state-owned enterprises, collectively owned enterprises prior to the 
economic reforms, state agencies, government departments, and other organizations belonging to the 
public sector, among which the state-owned enterprises were most typical. The dawei system featured 
three elements: job tenure (iron rice bowl), egalitarian wage distribution (big rice pot), and a welfare 
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package (Ngok 2010). According to Ngok (2008), more than eighty percent of the urban labor force was 
covered by the danwei system prior to the economic reforms.  
The danweis offered their employees and their families comprehensive welfare packages and the 
welfare costs were taken as the cost of production. Old age pensions, health insurance, paid sickness 
leave, maternity benefits for women and many other welfare services were included in the packages 
(Saunders and Shang 2001). The danwei-based welfare protection system was fragmented in at least two 
aspects. First, the coverage of the formal welfare protection provision was restricted to urban population. 
The state took only residual responsibility for the rural population and the rural social benefits covered 
only a small proportion of the most desperate people (Gao 2006). Movement of population between the 
urban-rural sectors was greatly prevented or impeded by the hukou system (Gustafsson and Deng 2011). 
Second, within the urban population, there is a substantive division between those belonging to the 
public sector and those in the non-public sector. The public sector provided comprehensive welfare 
protection to their employees. On the contrary, individuals from the non-public urban sector mainly 
relied on themselves, their families and the market for social support (Saunders and Shang 2001). For 
decades China operated a limited number of relief programs for those who were not included in the 
danweis, targeting mainly at disabled veterans and the most vulnerable groups, namely the “three nos”: 
people who have no source of income, no working ability and no family. The benefits were very low and 
the payment was subject to a means-test. 
The market-oriented economic reforms since 1978 brought massive uncertainties and risks to urban 
workers. By the mid-1980s, many state-owned enterprises were facing a decline in manufacturing, rising 
competition from the non-public sector, rural industry and globalized economy, leading to mass losses 
among the state-owned enterprises (Solinger 2005). To make the inefficient state-owned enterprises to 
survive in the competitive market economy, the government gradually liberalized the production and 
management autonomy of the state-owned enterprises. Most significantly, the state-owned enterprises 
were given the power to dismiss recalcitrant workers. Some workers became unemployed because of 
the bankruptcy of their enterprises. Other workers were dismissed due to the increasing competition in 
the urban labor markets. This was because the marketed-oriented economic reforms lessened the 
restrictions for rural population to migrate and released millions of rural labor from agricultural industry 
into urban areas. Consequently, former urban workers were dismissed in large numbers. Between mid-
1990s and early 2000s, over twenty million workers in state-owned enterprises were released from the 
production process (Ngok 2010). 
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The market-oriented economic reforms have a profound impact on the development of the welfare 
protection system in China as well. The government made great efforts to transform the traditional 
danwei-based welfare protection system into a multiple-tire social insurance based system since the 
mid-1980s. The new social insurance system is employment-based, consisting of old age pensions, 
unemployment insurance, health care insurance, maternity leave benefits and work-related injury 
insurance. These social insurance programs, together with other welfare programs, such as housing and 
schooling, were gradually separated from the commercial activities of the state-owned enterprises. The 
state-owned enterprises were no longer responsible to provide generous welfare programs to their 
employees. Many urban workers thus became poor even though they were employed as their 
enterprises had difficulties in guaranteeing the wages or in delivering adequate benefits (e.g. Leung 
2003).  
The growing of low income families and unemployed constituted an imminent threat to social and 
political stability which could not be eliminated by the limited number of traditional relief programs. By 
way of response, the Chinese government established a need-based and means-tested social assistance 
program, referred to as the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG, or Dibao) program, in cities. The 
program was first launched in Shanghai in 1993 for its urban registered residents. One of the goals was 
to provide protection to all eligible households and to assure full delivery of the benefits (Zhang 2012). 
Subsequently, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the central government department in charge of social 
assistance policy in China, encouraged other cities to learn from Shanghai’s practice and promoted the 
rapid spread of the reform. The first regulatory framework of the MLG system was issued by the State 
Council in 1999. The “Regulations on Guaranteeing Urban Residents’ Minimum Living Standard” 
regulated that “urban residents with non-agricultural household registration status, if the average 
income of their family members is below the minimum living standard of local urban residents, are 
entitled to material assistance from the local government for their basic life” (State Council 1999). The 
1999 Regulation legalizes the rights of urban residents to social assistance. After several decades of 
development, the MLG system was expanded to cover all cities and towns in China by the end of the 
year 1999.  
Since 2003, the number of MLG recipients has become stable, marking that the MLG entered a 
stage of consolidation. The administration of the MLG system has been improved. Many local 
governments have classified the MLG recipients and performed different management for different 
types of recipients. Other social assistance programs such as medical, employment, education and 
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housing are extended. Consequently, a MLG-based social assistance system has been established in 
urban China (Ngok 2010). 
A turning point came in August 2008 when the “Social Assistance Law (draft)” was released. The law 
is a signal that the administration of the MLG becomes fully legalized. Since then, a series of reforms 
have been imposed on China’s MLG system. For example, in October 2008, the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
released the “Way to Identify Urban Low Income Families”. In August 2010 the “Ministry of Civil Affairs 
Notification on Further Strengthening the Identification of Urban Dibao Target” was published. In 2011, 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs released the “Guiding Comments on Further Specifying the Formulation and 
Adjustment Mechanisms of the Urban and Rural Minimum Livelihood Guarantee Standard”. These 
reforms aim to specify the conditions to become the MLG targets and strengthen the linkage between 
the MLG standard lines and people’s daily necessities and living cost (Zhong 2011).  
2.2 Administration of the MLG Programs 
The Ministry of Civil Affairs is in charge of the administration of the MLG programs at the country level 
and acts as one of the key policy makers regarding the policy design and changes of the benefit policy 
(Zhang 2012). In practice, however, the benefits are actually given by local governments. Variations 
between municipalities are substantial. Each city has considerable scope to enact its own rules of 
governing the finance and determining the MLG standard lines (Chen and Barrientos 2006). In principle, 
local governments take the main responsibility for underwriting the program. The central government 
takes on a share of the cost for local governments who cannot finance it (Solinger 2005). To apply for the 
MLG benefits, the head of the household should formally submit their application to the local street 
office, which is a neighborhood-based agency of the district People’s Government, or the township 
government. The local street offices or the township governments assess the eligibility of the claimants 
at the preliminary stage. The county civil affairs department makes the final decision. Delivery of the 
MLG benefits is operated by the local residential committees (State Council 1999).  
2.3 Eligibility Conditions and Activation Requirements 
The expansion of the MLG scheme in urban China since the 1990s can best be regarded as the 
policymaker’s response to fulfill the need for income support during the transition towards a market 
economy. Not only working age people but also old-age people are covered by the MLG system. In urban 
China, coverage of old age pensions is far from universal. High financial burden of elderly dependents 
without pensions can lead households to fall into poverty (Saunders and Sun 2006). Theoretically, three 
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types of targets are covered by the MLG programs: the traditional “three nos”; the unemployed on 
unemployment insurance or whose entitlement to unemployment insurance has expired with their 
average household income below the locally decided MLG standard line; or employees, lay-offs and 
retirees whose working income including living allowances and pensions are below the locally decided 
MLG standard line (Tang et al. 2003).  
Based on the 1999 Regulation, there are two key determinants to be entitled to the MLG benefits. 
The first eligibility concerns family formulation and residency status. Applicants of MLG are required to 
be urban residents with their non-agricultural hukou in the city of residence. In this respect, the hukou 
system restricts the welfare provision to households with urban registration status while rural residents 
who have migrated to the cities are excluded from the MLG system. Although in some regions the hukou 
system has been reformed, the division between the rural and urban areas is still large.  
Second, to be eligible for the MLG benefits, per capita families’ total income and assets ought to be 
below the local MLG standard line. The MLG standard line is computed in accordance with the minimum 
living standard, which is usually based on expenditure surveys of low income families and the financial 
capacity of the local government. The 1999 Regulation stipulates that urban residents are eligible for the 
benefits when household per capita income from all sources is below the local MLG standard line. 
Calculation of total household income sums up all monetary income and income in kind, including 
financial contributions from legally dependents and children.2 Other factors, namely financial assets, 
employment status, health conditions and housing are also considered (Du and Park 2007).  
The provision of the MLG benefits is not subject to a time limit, as long as one needs to. In practice, 
only people who are disabled are provided with regular or long-term benefits. To maintain work ethic, it 
is usually difficult for the able-bodied to receive MLG benefits or they can only receive short-term 
benefits. The able-bodied recipients must register at employment agencies and anticipate in public 
community service activities (State Council 1999). In Shanghai for example, able-bodied beneficiaries of 
the MLG program must register at the employment agencies and cannot refuse job offers without any 
proper reason. Meanwhile, they must participate in vocational training provided by the employment 
agencies. Those who are unemployed must take part in public community service activities. In case of 
violation of these requirements, MLG beneficiaries may face an elimination or termination of the benefit 
                                                          
2 According to the Chinese Marriage Law, relatives are responsible to support other members in the household, 
including husband and wife, parents and children under 18 or still in education, grandparents and grandchildren if 
the parents of the children have passed away, adult children and their parents or grandparents, adult brothers or 
sisters to their siblings who are disabled or below 18 years old or in school, if their parents have passed away or 
cannot support their siblings. 
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eligibility (Huang et al. 2005). In some other cities, recipients who refuse job offers twice may not be 
entitled to the benefits (Shang and Wu 2004).  
2.4 Determination of the MLG Benefit Level 
The MLG standard lines are set by local governments, under which people can apply for the benefits. The 
MLG standard lines are expressed as monthly amount in Chinese yuan. Several factors are taken into 
account for determining the MLG standard line: locally per capita living standard; basic necessities to 
maintain a minimum living standard; the level of economic development and financial capability of the 
local government; and the price index (State Council 1999). Since 2000 cities like Xiamen and Hangzhou 
started to set MLG standard lines on the basis of the number of members in the family (Cao 2007). Set at 
a subsistence level, the MLG benefit is a benefit package covering basic food, clothing, housing and 
appropriate hydropower and gas cost as well as expenses on compulsory education if applicable (State 
Council 1999). In reality, it is the local governments’ financial capacity that often restricts the 
determination of the MLG standard lines. In many less developed regions, the MLG standard lines are 
usually lower than what is needed to meet the households’ actual basic needs (Du and Park 2007). The 
MLG standard lines are adjusted in accordance with changes in consumer prices and the financial 
capability of the city government (Gao et al. 2009). The equation of the MLG standard line can be 
expressed as follows (Hong 2003): 
MLG standard line = [F+NF] * Sn * β 
Here, MLG standard line is expressed by an average per person. F is the average food expenditure 
per person and NF is the basic non-food expenditure per person. Sn is the impact factor of the household 
size where n = 1, 2, 3 …. β is adjusted according to the changes in local per capita disposable income, 
which is bounded between [1~1.2]. In principle, the MLG standard line should be lower than the 
minimum wage, unemployment benefits and pensions (Leung 2006). What a family receives is the 
difference between the total MLG benefits eligible – local MLG standard line multiplied by the number of 
persons entitled within the household – and the total household income. The equation can be set as: 
Eligible MLG benefits = MLG standard line * household size – total household income 
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3. Data and Method 
3.1 Sample of Regions and Data Years 
In this paper, we track the development of urban MLG programs across 31 municipalities, provinces and 
autonomous regions. As such, we cover all urban areas from the eastern, central and western regions of 
China. We expect variations across regions since the eastern regions are more advanced in social and 
economic development while western regions are lagging behind. Rural MLG programs are not included. 
It was not until 2007 that the rural MLG programs were extended to rural poor population nationwide. 
Even so, compared to the urban MLG programs, rural MLG programs are less developed and many 
districts have not fully established the scheme and therefore only a small fraction of the poor people are 
covered (Deng and Wu 2006; Gao 2006). The empirical analyses are based on the period of 2003-2013. 
Various data sources are used, including the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2004-2014), National Bureau of 
Population and Employment Statistics Division (2004-2013), National Bureau of Statistics of China (2004-
2014), and local government websites.  
3.2 Expenditure on MLG Programs 
To start with, we construct two indicators to measure MLG expenditure. First, we employ the indicator 
of social expenditure on urban MLG programs as a share of local GDP. Second, the indicator of social 
expenditure on urban MLG programs as a share of local public expenditure is used to assess the 
government expenditure preference for supporting the unemployed and poor. According to Castles 
(2008), the disaggregated program expenditure offers an approach to measure the relative importance 
of the benefit program. One-time or temporary social assistance benefits to cover unexpected and 
urgent needs or regular supplements to cover exceptional needs are not considered in the MLG packages.  
3.3 MLG Recipients 
The coverage rate or take-up rate is of interest since it measures the extent to which individuals manage 
to receive social benefits for which they are actually eligible (Gao and Zhai 2012). Existing studies suggest 
that MLG eligible families often lack access to the benefits or are not willing to apply (Ravallion et al. 
2006; Wang 2007). In this study we focus on the take-up rate since while the administrative databases 
may record benefit receipt accurately, they contain no information on non-recipients. Specifically, we 
measure the coverage of the MLG benefits in both absolute and relative terms: the number of MLG 
benefit recipients and the number of the recipients as a share of local non-agricultural population at the 
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end of the year. As stated above, applicants of the MLG benefits need to be registered as the non-
agricultural population with their hukou in the urban areas. 
3.4 Real MLG Levels 
The benefit level is relatively straightforward in measuring the generosity of social benefits, as it is just 
the amount of cash benefit (Olaskoaga et al. 2013). We use two types of MLG benefit levels. First, MLG 
standard reflects the income line needed to meet the basic living standards. This indicator has the 
advantage that it is not affected by the mis-targeting problem which occurs when eligible households do 
not receive the benefits or ineligible households do receive benefits (Wang 2007). Usually the standard 
lines are adjusted according to the changes in consumer prices and the financial capability of the local 
governments. We take the MLG standard lines at the end of the year in case there might be adjustment 
within the year. Second, MLG expenditure per person implies the actual benefit levels spent by local 
governments on each recipient. This indicator reflects the gap between the standard MLG line and per 
capita household income of the recipient. In order to compare the benefit levels over time, all benefits 
are adjusted by inflation based on local urban consumer price index (CPI 2013=100).  
3.5 MLG Replacement Rates 
Minimum income replacement rate is a state-of-art indicator as it allows us to measure the generosity of 
the benefit relative to income from work. Minimum income replacement rate has been utilized for 
international comparison across the European and non-EU OECD countries (Wang and Van Vliet 2014) 
but not for China. Following their practice, we first compute the replacement rate as a ratio of the MLG 
standard to average wage. The average wage is the average earnings of employment in urban work units. 
MLG benefit in comparison with the average wage enables us to indicate how the MLG benefits balance 
between need and incentive (Gustafsson and Deng 2011). In China, most MLG recipients are more likely 
to receive minimum wage instead of average wage since they are usually work dis-abled or low-skilled 
(Huang et al. 2005). Therefore, we also compute a MLG replacement rate as the ratio of MLG standard to 
minimum wage.  
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4. Development of MLG programs in urban China over 2007-2013 
4.1 Number of MLG Recipients and Its Share in Local Urban Non-agricultural Population 
Figure 1 depicts the nationwide trends in the number of MLG recipients and its percentage in non-
agricultural population between 2003 and 2012. The number of the MLG recipients at the national level 
is the sum of the numbers of MLG recipients in all regions. Figure 1 shows that the number of the MLG 
recipients reached the peak in 2009 and has declined largely since then. On the other hand, the share of 
the MLG recipients in relation to urban non-agricultural population has been decreasing over time. In 
2010, the “Ministry of Civil Affairs Notification on Further Strengthening the Identification of Urban 
Dibao Target” was issued. The notification not only defines the conditions for becoming MLG target but 
also regulates that those who do not meet the conditions should return what they have received. Since 
then, the number of urban MLG recipients decreased significantly.  
Figure 1. Trends in the number of MLG recipients and its share of non-agricultural population in China,  
                 2003-2012 
 
Note: Data for non-agricultural population is not available for the year 2013.  
Source: China Civil Affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2014, China Population & Employment Statistical Yearbook 2014 and own 
calculations.  
Trends in the MLG recipients across regions are presented in Table 1. The number of the MLG 
recipients at the national level is the sum of the numbers of the MLG recipients in all regions. For each 
group, the regions are ranked in order of the number of MLG recipients as a share of local non-
agricultural population in 2012 (from smallest to largest). The number of MLG recipients varied 
significantly across regions. In particular, in the most developed regions, which are mainly from the east, 
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there were far fewer people supported by the MLG programs and the ratios of the recipients in total 
local non-agricultural population were much lower. The central part of China had the largest number of 
MLG recipients although they constituted a smaller percentage in local non-agricultural population 
compared to the west. One reason for the large cross regional variation might be that in the less 
developed central and western regions, people often do not have sufficient resources to meet their basic 
needs. And also, in the less developed regions, social protection programs like unemployment benefits 
and old-age pensions are less developed. 
At the national level, the number of MLG recipients increased between the period 2003-2008. The 
increase occurred mainly in the west. In fact, in the eastern and central part of China, the number of the 
MLG recipients decreased both before and after 2008. Even the west has observed a decrease in the 
number of the MLG recipients since 2008. Finally, all regions witnessed decreases in the MLG recipients 
in terms of total local non-agricultural population over time.  
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Table 1. Trends in the number of MLG recipients and its share of local non-agricultural population across    
                regions, 2003-2012 
 Number of MLG recipients (million) 
MLG recipients as a share of non-agricultural 
population (%) 
 2003 2008 2012 2003 2008 2012 
National 22.47 23.35 21.44 6.0% 5.3% 4.5% 
East       Zhejiang 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 
Guangdong 0.35 0.40 0.37 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 
Jiangsu 0.34 0.46 0.37 1.2% 1.3% 0.9% 
Beijing 0.16 0.15 0.11 1.9% 1.5% 1.1% 
Shandong 0.72 0.61 0.53 2.5% 1.7% 1.3% 
Fujian 0.19 0.20 0.17 1.9% 1.7% 1.4% 
Shanghai 0.45 0.34 0.22 4.3% 2.8% 1.7% 
Tianjin 0.24 0.16 0.17 4.4% 2.7% 2.7% 
Hebei 0.82 0.94 0.77 4.5% 4.2% 3.3% 
Hainan 0.13 0.18 0.16 6.2% 5.3% 4.6% 
Liaoning 1.60 1.37 1.07 8.1% 6.5% 4.9% 
Central       Anhui 1.04 0.99 0.82 7.9% 6.6% 5.2% 
Hainan 1.26 1.46 1.33 6.5% 6.4% 5.5% 
Hubei 1.66 1.44 1.30 9.4% 6.1% 6.1% 
Jilin 1.46 1.28 0.91 12.2% 10.4% 7.1% 
Shanxi 0.84 0.92 0.89 8.9% 8.3% 7.6% 
Jiangxi 1.01 0.95 0.98 9.4% 7.6% 7.6% 
Heilongjiang 1.58 1.53 1.52 9.0% 8.3% 8.2% 
Hunan 1.43 1.45 1.46 10.2% 9.3% 9.2% 
West       Chongqing 0.70 0.79 0.52 9.3% 8.7% 3.9% 
Guangxi 0.60 0.57 0.52 6.7% 5.9% 5.0% 
Shannxi 0.79 0.84 0.75 8.8% 7.9% 5.1% 
Ningxia 0.24 0.21 0.18 12.2% 9.0% 7.0% 
Sichuan 1.46 1.86 1.86 8.2% 8.4% 7.3% 
Guizhou 0.43 0.55 0.53 7.2% 8.4% 7.7% 
Inner Mongolia 0.70 0.85 0.81 8.1% 8.6% 8.0% 
Yunnan 0.64 0.86 0.94 9.4% 11.6% 9.0% 
Tibet 0.04 0.04 0.05 10.1% 7.5% 9.1% 
Xinjiang 0.72 0.76 0.96 10.4% 8.5% 10.0% 
Qinghai 0.20 0.22 0.23 14.1% 13.7% 11.3% 
Gansu 0.57 0.90 0.88 10.0% 13.4% 11.9% 
Mean-East 0.46 0.44 0.37 3.3% 2.7% 2.1% 
Mean-Central 1.29 1.25 1.15 9.2% 7.9% 7.1% 
Mean-West 0.59 0.70 0.68 9.5% 9.3% 7.9% 
Note: Data for non-agricultural population is not available for the year 2013.  
Source: China Civil Affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2014, China Population & Employment Statistical Yearbook 2014 and own 
calculations.  
 
4.2 MLG Expenditure as a Share of Local  GDP and Local Public Expenditure 
Figure 2 shows the indicators of MLG expenditure as a share of local GDP and local public expenditure 
across 31 regions in 2013 grouped into three regions: eastern, central and western regions. In general, 
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variation in MLG expenditure was significant across regions. Low ratios are mainly found in eastern 
regions, including Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, Beijing, and Jiangsu. High ratios are found in Jilin, 
Heilongjiang, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Gansu. On average, the east had the lowest MLG expenditure 
while the central had the highest. One reason for the lower ratios in the eastern regions could be that 
the more developed eastern regions often have higher GDP and higher public expenditure than the 
central and the west– the denominator effect. In general, MLG expenditure was rather low in 2013. 
Gansu province had the highest MLG expenditure ratio relative to local GDP, which was lower than 0.5 
percent. Regarding MLG expenditure as a share of local public expenditure, the highest ratio appeared in 
Heilongjiang province, which was around 1.5 percent.  
Figure 2. MLG expenditure as a share of local GDP and local public expenditure, 2013 
  
Source: China Civil Affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2014, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/workspace/index?m=hgjd/) and own calculations.  
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Figure 3 depicts the trends in MLG expenditure across the eastern, central and western regions for 
2005, 2008 and 2013. The left hand bars show changes in MLG expenditure as a share of local GDP while 
the right hand bards show changes in MLG expenditure as a share of local public expenditure for the 
three regions. On average, MLG expenditure as a share of local GDP remained stable in the three regions 
between 2005 and 2013. However, opposite trends could be found before and after 2008 that MLG 
expenditure as a share of local GDP has decreased in all regions since 2008. With respect to MLG 
expenditure as a share of local public expenditure, decreases could be observed in all regions over 2005 
and 2013. The decreases mainly occurred after 2008. In early November 2008, China announced a 
massive fiscal stimulus package of RMB 4tn (around 586 U.S. dollars) to offset the sharp decline in 
external demand due to the global recession. As most of the funding responsibility would be covered by 
local governments and institutes, local public expenditure increased dramatically. However, a large part 
of the local public expenditure was allocated to public investment to promote economic growth, such as 
transportation network, rural infrastructure, and the Sichuan post-earthquake reconstruction (Liu 2009). 
As a result, social welfare expenditure decreased relatively in terms of local public expenditure. Detailed 
information for the trends in MLG expenditure as a share of local GDP and as a share of local public 
expenditure for the 31 regions are presented in Appendix 1.  
Figure 3. Trends in MLG expenditure as a share of local GDP  and local public expenditure, 2005-2013 
 
Note: Data of MLG expenditure are not available for the years 2003 and 2004.  
Source: China Civil Affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2004-2014, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/workspace/index?m=hgjd/) and own calculations.  
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4.3 Real MLG Standard and Real MLG expenditure Per Person (Monthly) 
Figure 4 shows the real monthly MLG standards and real monthly MLG expenditure per person by local 
governments in 2013. The benefit levels are expressed in real values adjusted by local urban CPI (local 
urban CPI 2013 = 100). MLG expenditure per person reflects the difference between the MLG standard 
and per capita household income for the recipient. The real benefit levels varied substantially across 
regions. Regions from the east got higher MLG standards and real MLG expenditure per person than 
regions from the central and west. The highest benefit levels are found in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Beijing, 
Tianjin and Shanghai. There is no big difference between the central and west. The large gap between 
the east and the other two groups of regions may partly be explained by the fact that in the more 
developed eastern regions, consumer prices and living standards are much higher. Meanwhile, the 
economic situation of local governments in eastern regions is usually better than that in the central and 
west therefore they can provide more generous benefits. High MLG standards are usually associated 
with high MLG expenditure per person. However, there are some exceptions. For instance, Beijing had 
lower real MLG standard than Tianjin in 2013 but its MLG expenditure per person was much higher than 
the latter. Overall, the MLG standards and MLG expenditure per person are quite low in China. In 2013, 
the national MLG standard was only 391.2 yuan (around 63 U.S. dollars) and the national MLG 
expenditure per person was 289.8 yuan (around 46.7 U.S. dollars) per month.   
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Figure 4. Real monthly MLG standard and real monthly MLG expenditure per person, 2013 
  
Note: The national MLG standard and national real MLG expenditure are the simple averages of the 31 regions.  
Source: China Civil Affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2014, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/workspace/index?m=hgjd/) and own calculations.  
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intensified China’s unemployment problems, causing social tensions and instability. As a result, local 
governments began to take initiatives for more generous welfare protection programs to maintain social 
stability (Liu 2009). Further information of the trends in real monthly MLG standard and real monthly 
MLG expenditure per person across the 31 regions can be found in Appendix 2.  
Figure 5. Trends in real monthly MLG standard and MLG expenditure per person, 2003-2013 
  
Source: China Civil Affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2014, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/workspace/index?m=hgjd/) and own calculations.  
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In Table 2 we present the local MLG standards and our estimated food, lower and upper poverty 
lines for the 29 regions in 2013. Almost in all regions the MLG standards were higher than the three 
types of poverty lines. Guangdong province was the only exception which set a lower MLG standard than 
the upper poverty line. Therefore, the generosity of the MLG standards has been improving that the 
MLG standard lines has been effective in poverty alleviation in most urban regions.  
Table 2. MLG standard and estimated food, lower and upper poverty line in 29 regions, 2013.   
 
MLG 
standard 
Food poverty 
line 
Lower poverty 
line 
Upper poverty 
line Difference Difference Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1)/(2)-1 (1)/(3)-1 (1)/(4)-1 
Beijing 580.0 221.31 295.22 374.27 1.62 0.96 0.55 
Tianjin 600.0 180.71 245.31 309.9 2.32 1.45 0.94 
Hebei 378.5 125.33 171.35 221.39 2.02 1.21 0.71 
Shanxi 351.1 101.11 143.25 193.19 2.47 1.45 0.82 
Inner 
 
460.3 105.99 146.85 195.35 3.34 2.13 1.36 
Liaoning 411.5 120.57 168.1 217.26 2.41 1.45 0.89 
Jilin 322.5 105.35 147.69 194.35 2.06 1.18 0.66 
Heilongjiang 387.7 107.13 148.06 191.82 2.62 1.62 1.02 
Shanghai 640.0 262.23 341.31 409.63 1.44 0.88 0.56 
Jiangsu 485.1 148.23 194.38 233.77 2.27 1.50 1.08 
Zhejiang 515.5 184.11 244.44 300.93 1.80 1.11 0.71 
Anhui 380.5 123.89 162.75 194.84 2.07 1.34 0.95 
Fujian 363.3 161.48 226.07 284.21 1.25 0.61 0.28 
Jiangxi 395.7 122.85 165.83 210.49 2.22 1.39 0.88 
Shandong 417.7 147.26 215.33 306.49 1.84 0.94 0.36 
Henan 309.2 113.75 162.04 219.8 1.72 0.91 0.41 
Hubei 375.1 150.95 203.67 258.49 1.48 0.84 0.45 
Hunan 356.1 130.25 171.78 211.93 1.73 1.07 0.68 
Guangdong 380.4 240.84 316.07 383.93 0.58 0.20 -0.01 
Guangxi 334.7 168.7 218.42 264.98 0.98 0.53 0.26 
Hainan 353.3 162.85 211.45 252.52 1.17 0.67 0.40 
Sichuan 306.4 137.19 180.88 219.65 1.23 0.69 0.39 
Guizhou 347.6 134.52 175.4 212.23 1.58 0.98 0.64 
Yunnan 323.9 158.17 207.64 255.82 1.05 0.56 0.27 
Shaanxi 374.7 120.41 169.3 226.78 2.11 1.21 0.65 
Gansu 279.0 141.24 191.43 246.04 0.98 0.46 0.13 
Qinghai 330.8 136.68 185.62 236.81 1.42 0.78 0.40 
Ningxia 287.6 127.67 185.94 261.1 1.25 0.55 0.10 
Xinjiang 300.4 126.03 169.88 217.63 1.38 0.77 0.38 
Source: Meng et al. (2005), National Bureau of Statistics of China (http://data.stats.gov.cn/workspace/index?m=hgjd/) and own 
calculations.  
 
4.4 Generosity of the MLG Standard Relative to Labor Income – Measured by MLG Replacement Rates 
Although the MLG standards are set higher than the poverty lines in China. The generosity of the 
benefits in relation to work income, measured by the MLG standard as a share of average wage or 
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minimum wage (see Figure 6). At the national level, the MLG standard as a share of average wage was 
9.4 percent while the MLG standard as a share of minimum wage reached 30.2 percent in 2013. The low 
ratio of the MLG standard to local minimum wage may reflect the relationship between the three-tier 
basic income support in China: minimum wage > unemployment insurance > MLG standard (Sunders and 
Shang 2001). Unemployment insurance is usually linked to minimum wage, which vary between 70-80 
percent of minimum wage (Leung 2003). Based on the three-tier income support, the share of the MLG 
standard in minimum wage would be even lower. Moreover, the MLG benefit in China usually does not 
account for rental cost as the recipients usually have their own dwellings or live in subsidized public 
housing (Leung and Wong 1999). Minimum wage, on the other hand, is closely linked to local average 
wage, productivity, unemployment level, economic development and minimum living expenses, and is 
especially focused on rural migrants (Wang and Gunderson 2011).  
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Figure 6. MLG standard as a share of local average wage and as a share of local minimum wage, 2013 
  
Note: The national replacement rates are the simple averages of the 31 regions.  
Source: China Civil Affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2014, China Statistical Yearbook 2014 and local government websites.  
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after 2008, the decreases were much smaller after 2008 and many regions actually increased their MLG 
generosity in relation to minimum wage.  
Table 3. Trends in MLG standard as a share of average wage and as a share of minimum wage, 2003- 
                2013 
  MLG standard as a share of average wage (%) MLG standard as a share of minimum wage (%) 
  2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013 
East            Guangdong 12.3  9.2  8.6  40.4  29.8  24.5  
Fujian 14.4  9.9  9.0  35.8  28.1  27.5  
Hebei 17.0  9.7  10.9  44.9  28.8  28.7  
Shandong 15.5  10.7  10.7  39.5  30.9  30.3  
Hainan 16.7  10.4  9.4  32.2  30.0  31.5  
Liaoning 16.3  9.9  10.9  48.6  32.0  31.7  
Jiangsu 14.4  10.7  10.2  34.8  32.7  32.8  
Zhejiang 12.1  10.6  10.9  41.0  30.9  35.1  
Shanghai 13.6  9.2  8.4  50.9  41.7  39.5  
Tianjin 15.6  12.0  10.6  50.2  48.8  40.0  
Beijing 13.9  8.4  7.5  58.6  48.8  41.4  
Central             
Jilin 14.1  8.3  9.0  36.1  24.9  24.4  
Henan 14.1  8.3  9.7  32.9  26.0  24.9  
Shanxi 14.0  9.4  9.1  36.5  27.8  27.2  
Hunan 13.8  9.0  10.0  34.5  27.1  28.2  
Hubei 15.5  10.1  10.3  34.3  26.8  28.9  
Anhui 17.9  9.9  9.6  41.9  37.9  30.2  
Jiangxi 12.9  11.3  11.2  44.8  33.3  32.2  
Heilongjiang 16.7  11.1  11.4  38.5  29.5  33.4  
West             
Xinjiang 11.8  7.0  7.3  28.3  17.9  19.8  
Ningxia 14.3  7.5  6.8  43.7  33.4  22.1  
Gansu 12.7  8.0  7.8  45.7  25.4  23.3  
Sichuan 13.1  9.2  7.7  39.7  32.8  25.5  
Yunnan 14.4  10.2  9.2  42.2  29.1  25.6  
Guangxi 14.1  8.6  9.7  40.0  26.6  27.9  
Qinghai 12.1  7.5  7.7  58.5  31.4  30.9  
Shannxi 14.4  8.1  9.5  42.2  28.7  32.6  
Chongqing 14.3  10.4  8.3  46.3  34.0  33.0  
Guizhou 12.1  7.9  8.8  31.1  24.4  33.7  
Inner Mongolia 13.6  9.0  10.9  38.5  28.7  34.1  
Tibet 8.6  7.0  9.0  . 35.0  36.0  
Mean-National 14.1  9.3  9.4  41.1  31.1  30.2  
Mean-East 14.7  10.1  9.7  43.4  34.8  33.0  
Mean-Central 14.9  9.7  10.0  37.4  29.2  28.7  
Mean-West 13.0  8.4  8.6  41.5  28.9  28.7  
Note: The national replacement rates are the simple averages of the 31 regions.  
Source: China Civil Affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2004-2014, China Statistical Yearbook 2004-2014, Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, local Human Resources and Social Security Bureaus, Chinese Public 
information Online, and local government websites.  
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5. Convergence and Correlation Tests 
5.1 Convergence Test 
The descriptive analyses above suggest that the development of the MLG programs has followed 
different paths before and after 2008 in urban China. Since 2008, the governments have made great 
efforts to increase the generosity of the MLG schemes while put more stringent conditions on MLG 
beneficiaries. Consequently, the MLG standards increased significantly while the number of MLG 
recipients decreased enormously. However, the development of MLG programs varies considerable 
across regions. Thus the question rises as to how the dispersion across regions has changed over time. To 
answer this question, this study applies the relative convergence (divergence) test using the so-called 
coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean value of the 
corresponding data. A drop (rise) in the coefficient of variation suggest a convergence (divergence) 
across regions (Caminada et al. 2012). 
Table 4 shows the changes in the coefficient of variation for real monthly MLG standard, real 
monthly MLG expenditure per person, MLG standard as a share of average wage and MLG standard as a 
share of minimum wage between 2003 and 2013. The two sets of indicators indicate the absolute 
amount of the benefits and the relative generosity of the benefits to labor income. We test the 
convergence (divergence) by using data from all regions. Between 2003 and 2013, the coefficient of 
variation decreased for the indicators of real MLG standard, real MLG expenditure per person, MLG 
standard as a share of minimum wage. The decrease mainly occurred after 2008. Although the 
coefficient of variation for the MLG standard as a share of average wage increased before 2008, it has 
been decreasing after that. Overall, China has observed decline in the coefficient of variation for all 
indicators after 2008, implying a convergence of the generosity levels of the MLG programs across 
regions since 2008.  
Table 4. Convergence test for the development of MLG programs in China using the coefficient of  
                 variation, 2003-2013 
Coefficient of variation 2003 2008 2013 
Change 
2003-
2008 
Change 
2008-
2013 
Change 
2003-
2013 
Real monthly MLG standard 0.256 0.304 0.231 0.048 -0.073 -0.026 
Real monthly MLG expenditure per person 0.413 0.315 0.280 -0.098 -0.035 -0.132 
MLG standard as a share of minimum wage 0.179 0.207 0.173 0.028 -0.034 -0.006 
MLG standard as a share of average wage 0.131 0.140 0.135 0.009 -0.005 0.004 
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5.2 Correlation Test 
In Table 5, we report the correlations between MLG expenditure, MLG recipients and the benefit levels. 
The indicator of MLG replacement rate is not included since it is intrinsically determined by the benefit 
level as well as the work income. We use time series cross sectional data analysis based on the data from 
all regions over the period 2003-2013. As expected, MLG expenditure is highly and positively associated 
with the number of MLG recipients. Interestingly, the relationship between MLG expenditure and MLG 
benefit level is strongly negative. On the one hand, the drastic reduction in MLG recipients could help to 
decrease the MLG expenditure. On the other hand, after 2008 local public expenditure grew significantly. 
However, a large part of the public expenditure increase went to areas which helped to promote the 
economic growth. On contrary, the relative share of MLG expenditure in local public expenditure 
decreased. 
Table 5. Pearson’s correlations between the four sets of indicators 
 
MLG 
expenditure 
as a share 
of local GDP 
MLG 
expenditure 
as a share of 
local public 
 
Number 
of MLG 
recipients 
MLG recipients as 
a share of local 
non-agricultural 
population 
Real 
monthly 
MLG 
standard 
Real MLG 
expenditure 
per person 
MLG expenditure as a share of 
local GDP 
1      
MLG expenditure as a share of 
local public expenditure 0.742*** 1     
Number of MLG recipients 0.294*** 0.678*** 1    
MLG recipients as a share of 
local non-agricultural 
 
0.899*** 0.741*** 0.377*** 1   
Real monthly MLG standard -0.374*** -0.532*** -0.423*** -0.524*** 1  
Real MLG expenditure per 
person -0.093 -0.338*** -0.299*** -0.293*** 0.889*** 1 
* significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01.  
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Overall the past few years, the MLG system in urban China has been largely reformed, especially since 
2008. On the one hand, the governments performed the reforms to strengthen the role of the urban 
MLG system as the last resort safety net for poor people. On the other hand, MLG reforms are needed in 
the presence of the global financial crisis. The economic slowdown and fall in external demand due to 
the global recession led to increasing unemployment and social instability, in reaction to which the local 
governments began to take initiatives for more generous MLG benefits (Liu 2009). However, so far little 
is known about the impact of the reforms on the MLG development. Moreover, little attention has been 
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paid to the regional differences. This is remarkable given that the administration of the urban MLG 
programs is actually decentralized. Therefore, this paper engages on the development of the urban MLG 
programs in the 31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions over 2003-2013, thus covering all 
regions from the eastern, central and western part of China. 
The results show that the development of China’s urban MLG system varies considerably across 
regions over 2003-2013. In the more developed eastern regions, the numbers of the benefit recipients 
are very low. The governments manage to raise the benefit levels albeit with low MLG expenditure. On 
the contrary, in the less developed central and western regions with limited financial resources, since the 
benefit recipients are in large numbers, even high MLG expenditure could only maintain low benefit 
levels. However, differences in the generosity of the benefits expressed by MLG standard as a ratio of 
average wage and as a ratio of minimum wage across regions are not significant. Nevertheless, although 
the dispersion of the MLG development across regions is still large, the generosity levels of the MLG 
programs have been converging across regions since 2008.  
The development of the urban MLG system seems to follow a different path after 2008. Since then, 
the number of MLG recipients has been decreased significantly. Hence, the governments manage to 
increase the real benefit levels and increase the generosity of the benefits. The generosity of the benefit 
levels has been improving. In 2013 most regions actually had higher MLG standards higher than the 
poverty lines, implying that the MLG benefits were adequate for poor people’s survival. However, the 
generosity of the benefits relative to work income are quite low. In an era when economic development 
has increased the income of most labor, it would be demanding to construct an income redistribution 
mechanism for assisting those who are underprivileged. Overall, China’s MLG policy is still at its early 
stage. The curtained social expenditure on MLG programs may hamper its role in promoting social 
development. To improve the adequacy and efficiency of the MLG programs, one urgent problem is to 
specify the division of the tasks between the central and local governments. Local governments with 
better situation in the fiscal resources may increase their MLG standards in the presence of declining 
MLG recipients. For the local governments who cannot afford it, the role of the central government in 
MLG financing could be reinforced.  
Moreover, the urban MLG is based on the household registration status (hukou). Currently, there is 
a huge number of rural migrants entering the cities. Due to the lack of local hukou, they are blocked from 
the protection of the local MLG programs. Social rights of the floating migrants for basic needs are 
usually neglected by hosting governments. Further reforms may be of importance to eliminate the 
segregation between urban and rural areas and between the public and non-public sectors. After all, the 
27 
 
MLG system has become an important supplement to China’s employment-based social insurance 
system and essential to maintain social stability. Finally, this paper focuses on the MLG programs in 
urban China. Future research might be interesting to explore the development of rural MLG program and 
its impact of the poverty alleviation in China.  
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Appendix 1. Trends in MLG expenditure as a percentage of local GDP and local public expenditure across  
                       regions, 2005-2013 
  MLG expenditure as a share of local GDP MLG expenditure as a share of local public expenditure 
  2005 2008 2013 
Change 
2005-
2008 
Change 
2008-
2013 
Change 
2005-
2013 
2005 2008 2013 
Change 
2005-
2008 
Change 
2008-
2013 
Change 
2005-
2013 
East                         
Zhejiang 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.12% 0.08% 0.00% -0.05% -0.05% 
Guangdong 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.17% 0.18% 0.13% 0.01% -0.06% -0.04% 
Jiangsu 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% 0.27% 0.27% 0.16% 0.01% -0.11% -0.10% 
Fujian 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01% -0.01% 0.00% 0.23% 0.28% 0.15% 0.05% -0.12% -0.07% 
Shandong 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.36% 0.37% 0.26% 0.01% -0.11% -0.10% 
Beijing 0.06% 0.05% 0.03% -0.02% -0.01% -0.03% 0.42% 0.27% 0.16% -0.15% -0.11% -0.26% 
Shanghai 0.08% 0.07% 0.06% 0.00% -0.01% -0.02% 0.43% 0.39% 0.28% -0.04% -0.11% -0.15% 
Tianjin 0.07% 0.09% 0.06% 0.02% -0.03% -0.01% 0.60% 0.67% 0.33% 0.06% -0.33% -0.27% 
Hebei 0.06% 0.09% 0.07% 0.03% -0.02% 0.01% 0.63% 0.80% 0.47% 0.16% -0.33% -0.16% 
Hainan 0.09% 0.16% 0.13% 0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 0.54% 0.68% 0.42% 0.14% -0.25% -0.11% 
Liaoning 0.17% 0.17% 0.14% -0.01% -0.03% -0.04% 1.16% 1.06% 0.72% -0.11% -0.33% -0.44% 
Central                     
Henan 0.09% 0.12% 0.10% 0.03% -0.01% 0.01% 0.85% 0.91% 0.59% 0.06% -0.32% -0.26% 
Anhui 0.14% 0.18% 0.14% 0.04% -0.05% -0.01% 1.07% 0.97% 0.60% -0.09% -0.38% -0.47% 
Hubei 0.19% 0.22% 0.15% 0.03% -0.06% -0.03% 1.58% 1.49% 0.86% -0.09% -0.62% -0.72% 
Hunan 0.16% 0.20% 0.17% 0.03% -0.02% 0.01% 1.23% 1.28% 0.90% 0.05% -0.38% -0.33% 
Jiangxi 0.18% 0.24% 0.18% 0.06% -0.05% 0.01% 1.28% 1.37% 0.77% 0.09% -0.60% -0.51% 
Shanxi 0.16% 0.22% 0.20% 0.05% -0.02% 0.04% 1.04% 1.20% 0.83% 0.16% -0.37% -0.20% 
Jilin 0.30% 0.33% 0.25% 0.04% -0.08% -0.04% 1.69% 1.81% 1.20% 0.12% -0.61% -0.49% 
Heilongjiang 0.21% 0.30% 0.36% 0.08% 0.06% 0.15% 1.48% 1.60% 1.54% 0.12% -0.05% 0.06% 
West                         
Guangxi 0.10% 0.12% 0.09% 0.02% -0.02% -0.01% 0.66% 0.64% 0.43% -0.02% -0.22% -0.24% 
Chongqing 0.22% 0.25% 0.12% 0.03% -0.13% -0.10% 1.55% 1.43% 0.49% -0.12% -0.93% -1.06% 
Shannxi 0.17% 0.21% 0.16% 0.03% -0.04% -0.01% 1.07% 1.05% 0.72% -0.02% -0.33% -0.35% 
Ningxia 0.26% 0.28% 0.17% 0.02% -0.12% -0.09% 1.00% 1.05% 0.46% 0.05% -0.58% -0.53% 
Sichuan 0.15% 0.21% 0.17% 0.06% -0.04% 0.02% 1.04% 0.90% 0.73% -0.14% -0.16% -0.30% 
Guizhou 0.22% 0.25% 0.19% 0.03% -0.06% -0.03% 0.84% 0.84% 0.50% 0.00% -0.34% -0.34% 
Inner Mongolia 0.17% 0.20% 0.21% 0.03% 0.01% 0.03% 0.99% 1.16% 0.95% 0.17% -0.20% -0.04% 
Yunnan 0.18% 0.23% 0.23% 0.05% 0.00% 0.05% 0.81% 0.90% 0.66% 0.09% -0.24% -0.15% 
Tibet 0.21% 0.16% 0.27% -0.05% 0.11% 0.07% 0.28% 0.17% 0.22% -0.11% 0.05% -0.06% 
Qinghai 0.43% 0.46% 0.34% 0.04% -0.12% -0.08% 1.36% 1.29% 0.60% -0.07% -0.70% -0.77% 
Xinjiang 0.26% 0.31% 0.35% 0.05% 0.04% 0.09% 1.29% 1.20% 0.95% -0.08% -0.25% -0.34% 
Gansu 0.28% 0.42% 0.45% 0.14% 0.02% 0.17% 1.26% 1.39% 1.22% 0.13% -0.16% -0.04% 
Mean-National 0.15% 0.18% 0.16% 0.03% -0.02% 0.01% 0.88% 0.89% 0.59% 0.01% -0.30% -0.29% 
Mean-East 0.06% 0.07% 0.05% 0.01% -0.01% 0.00% 0.45% 0.46% 0.29% 0.01% -0.17% -0.16% 
Mean-Central 0.18% 0.22% 0.19% 0.05% -0.03% 0.02% 1.28% 1.33% 0.91% 0.05% -0.42% -0.37% 
Mean-West 0.22% 0.26% 0.23% 0.04% -0.03% 0.01% 1.01% 1.00% 0.66% -0.01% -0.34% -0.35% 
Note: Data of MLG expenditure are not available for the years 2003 and 2004. The national MLG expenditure is the simple 
average of the MLG expenditure across the 31 regions.  
Source: China Civil Affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2004-2014, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/workspace/index?m=hgjd/) and own calculations.  
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Appendix 2. Trends in real monthly MLG standard and MLG expenditure per person across regions, 2003- 
                       2013 
 
MLG standard (Yuan, CPI 2013=100) Real MLG expenditure per person (Yuan, CPI 2013=100) 
 
2003 2008 2013 
Change 
2003-
2008 
Change 
2008-
2013 
Change 
2003-
2013 
2003 2008 2013 
Change 
2003-
2008 
Change 
2008-
2013 
Change 
2003-
2013 
East             
Hainan 198.1 220.3 353.3 22.2 133.0 155.2 82.0 137.6 237.1 55.6 99.5 155.1 
Fujian 226.3 236.5 363.3 10.2 126.8 137.0 71.0 148.8 240.4 77.7 91.6 169.4 
Hebei 207.8 221.1 378.5 13.3 157.4 170.7 62.2 157.6 231.9 95.4 74.3 169.7 
Guangdong 267.8 285.7 380.4 17.8 94.7 112.6 94.9 166.5 253.6 71.6 87.1 158.7 
Liaoning 227.9 255.0 411.5 27.1 156.5 183.6 79.4 155.2 312.7 75.7 157.5 233.3 
Shandong 206.7 262.4 417.7 55.7 155.3 211.0 62.5 154.7 286.4 92.2 131.7 223.9 
Jiangsu 251.8 316.7 485.1 64.8 168.4 233.3 101.8 186.1 296.5 84.3 110.4 194.7 
Zhejiang 276.5 335.2 515.5 58.7 180.3 239.0 144.1 282.7 400.4 138.7 117.7 256.3 
Beijing 366.9 443.3 580.0 76.3 136.7 213.1 242.9 345.0 510.9 102.0 165.9 268.0 
Tianjin 317.5 455.2 600.0 137.8 144.8 282.5 85.6 366.5 433.4 280.8 66.9 347.8 
Shanghai 375.8 454.4 640.0 78.7 185.6 264.2 173.6 277.7 500.9 104.0 223.2 327.3 
Central             
Henan 173.7 192.1 309.2 18.4 117.1 135.5 70.9 136.4 207.2 65.5 70.8 136.3 
Jilin 174.0 185.6 322.5 11.6 136.9 148.5 70.9 159.4 321.7 88.5 162.3 250.8 
Shanxi 167.8 226.5 351.1 58.7 124.6 183.3 75.8 162.8 240.7 87.0 77.9 164.9 
Hunan 188.6 205.1 356.1 16.5 151.0 167.5 64.2 153.7 244.4 89.5 90.7 180.2 
Hubei 187.2 213.4 375.1 26.2 161.7 187.9 73.8 162.1 246.6 88.3 84.5 172.8 
Anhui 207.7 238.7 380.5 31.0 141.8 172.8 68.3 149.3 271.5 81.0 122.2 203.2 
HeilongJiang 202.2 230.7 387.7 28.4 157.0 185.5 64.7 159.6 290.3 94.8 130.7 225.6 
Jiangxi 148.0 218.3 395.7 70.4 177.4 247.7 72.7 165.6 226.5 92.9 60.9 153.8 
West             
Gansu 177.9 185.1 279.0 7.3 93.9 101.1 80.6 177.1 268.9 96.5 91.8 188.3 
Ningxia 215.4 217.4 287.6 2.0 70.2 72.2 99.9 158.9 202.5 59.0 43.6 102.6 
Xinjiang 177.9 168.1 300.4 -9.8 132.3 122.5 94.4 167.9 266.7 73.4 98.8 172.3 
Sichuan 188.4 219.5 306.4 31.1 86.9 118.0 69.8 142.8 206.9 73.0 64.1 137.1 
Yunnan 217.2 230.2 323.9 13.0 93.7 106.7 88.6 163.9 224.2 75.3 60.3 135.6 
Qinghai 224.8 232.0 330.8 7.2 98.8 106.0 106.5 220.7 267.9 114.2 47.2 161.4 
Guangxi 188.9 200.0 334.7 11.2 134.7 145.8 76.4 138.3 228.3 62.0 90.0 151.9 
Chongqing 197.3 260.5 346.8 63.2 86.3 149.5 98.7 163.9 257.9 65.3 94.0 159.2 
Guizhou 147.8 179.1 347.6 31.3 168.5 199.8 70.5 153.4 245.9 82.9 92.5 175.4 
Shaanxi 185.0 199.2 374.7 14.2 175.5 189.7 68.5 174.8 308.3 106.3 133.5 239.8 
Tibet 228.3 299.3 432.4 71.1 133.1 204.1 110.1 166.2 384.4 56.1 218.2 274.3 
Inner Mongolia 171.1 225.7 460.3 54.5 234.6 289.2 71.4 198.8 367.5 127.4 168.7 296.1 
Mean-National 215.9 252.0 391.2 36.1 139.2 175.3 90.2 182.4 289.8 92.2 107.4 199.5 
Mean-East 265.7 316.9 465.9 51.1 149.1 200.2 109.1 216.2 336.7 107.1 120.5 227.6 
Mean-Central 181.1 213.8 359.7 32.7 145.9 178.6 70.2 156.1 256.1 86.0 100.0 185.9 
Mean-West 193.3 218.0 343.7 24.7 125.7 150.4 86.3 168.9 269.1 82.6 100.2 182.8 
Note: The national MLG standard and national real MLG expenditure are the simple averages of the 31 regions.  
Source: China Civil Affairs’ Statistical Yearbook 2014, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/workspace/index?m=hgjd/) and own calculations.  
 
Recent Research Memorandum Department of Economics Leiden University 
 
 
Research Memoranda 
- are available from Department of Economics homepage at : http://www.economie.leidenuniv.nl  
- can be ordered at Leiden University, Department of Economics, P.O. Box 9520, 2300 RA Leiden, The Nether-
lands Phone ++71 527 7756 / 1571;   E-mail: economie@law.leidenuniv.nl 
- for a complete list of Research Memoranda, see: http://www.economie.leidenuniv.nl 
 
 
2015.04 Jinxian Wang and Yanfeng Bai 
Development of Minimum Livelihood Guarantee Programs in Urban China: An Empirical Analy-
sis Based on 31 Regions over 2003-2013 
2015.03 Jinxian Wang, Koen Caminada, Kees Goudswaard and Chen Wang 
Decomposing income polarization and tax-benefit changes across 31 European countries and 
Europe wide, 2004-2012 
2015.02 Jinxian Wang, Olaf van Vliet and Kees Goudswaard 
Social assistance benefits and European coordination 
2015.01 Stefan Thewissen and David Rueda 
Technological change as a determinant of redistribution preferences 
2014.04 Jinxian Wang and Olaf van Vliet 
Social assistance and minimum income benefits: Benefit levels, replacement rates and policies 
across 33 countries, 1990-2009 
2014.03 Ben van Velthoven 
Bestraffing van commune misdrijven in de periode 1995-2012 
2014.02 Koen Caminada, Jim Been, Kees Goudswaard en Marloes de Graaf-Zijl 
De ontwikkeling van inkomensongelijkheid en inkomensherverdeling in Nederland 1990-2012 
 
2014.01 Ben van Velthoven 
Straftoemeting door de rechter in de periode 1995-2012 
2012.03 Jörg Paetzold and Olaf van Vliet 
Convergence without hard criteria: Does EU soft law affect domestic unemployment  
protection schemes? 
2012.02 Olaf van Vliet and Henk Nijboer 
Flexicurity in the European Union: Flexibility for Insiders, Security for Outsiders 
2012.01 Stefan Thewissen 
Is it the distribution or redistribution that affects growth? 
2011.03 Olaf van Vliet, Jim Been, Koen Caminada and Kees Goudswaard 
Pension reform and income inequality among the elderly in 15 European countries 
2011.02 Chen Wang and Koen Caminada 
Disentangling income inequality and the redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes in 
36 LIS countries 
2011.01 Anton Rommelse 
Een geschiedenis van het arbeidsongeschiktheidsbeleid in Nederland  
2010.03 Joop de Kort 
The Right to Development or the Development of Rights 
2010.02 Carolien Klein Haarhuis and Ben van Velthoven 
Legal Aid and Legal Expenses Insurance, Complements or Substitutes? The Case of The  
Netherlands? 
2010.01 Koen Caminada, Kees Goudswaard and Ferry Koster 
Social Income Transfers and Poverty Alleviation in OECD Countries. 
2009.03 Megan Martin and Koen Caminada 
Welfare Reform in the United States. A descriptive policy analysis. 
2009.02 Koen Caminada and Kees Goudswaard 
Social Expenditure and Poverty Reduction in the EU and other OECD Countries. 
 
2009.01 Maroesjka Versantvoort 
Complementariteit in arbeid- en zorgtijd. 
2008.06 Koen Caminada and Kees Goudswaard 
Effectiveness of poverty reduction in the EU. 
2008.05 Koen, Caminada, Kees Goudswaard and Olaf van Vliet 
Patterns of welfare state indicators in the EU. Is there convergence? 
2008.04 Kees Goudswaard and Koen Caminada 
The redistributive impact of public and private social expenditure. 
2008.03 Karen M. Anderson and Michael Kaeding 
Pension systems in the European Union: Variable patterns of influence in Italy, the  
Netherlands and Belgium. 
2008.02 Maroesjka Versantvoort 
Time use during the life course in USA, Norway and the Netherlands: a HAPC-analysis. 
2008.01 Maroesjka Versantvoort 
Studying time use variations in 18 countries applying a life course perspective. 
2007.06 Olaf van Vliet and Michael Kaeding 
Globalisation, European Integration and Social Protection – Patterns of Change or Continuity? 
2007.05 Ben van Velthoven 
Kosten-batenanalyse van criminaliteitsbeleid. Over de methodiek in het algemeen en  
Nederlandse toepassingen in het bijzonder. 
2007.04 Ben van Velthoven 
Rechtseconomie tussen instrumentaliteit en normativiteit. 
2007.03 Guido Suurmond 
Compliance to fire safety regulation. The effects of the enforcement strategy. 
2007.02 Maroesjka Versantvoort 
Een schets van de sociaal-economische effecten van verlof en de beleidsmatige dilemma’s die 
daaruit volgen. 
2007.01 Henk Nijboer 
A Social Europe: Political Utopia or Efficient Economics? An assessment from a public  
economic approach. 
2006.04 Aldo Spanjer 
European gas regulation: A change of focus. 
2006.03 Joop de Kort and Rilka Dragneva 
Russia’s Role in Fostering the CIS Trade Regime. 
2006.02 Ben van Velthoven 
Incassoproblemen in het licht van de rechtspraak. 
2006.01 Jurjen Kamphorst en Ben van Velthoven 
De tweede feitelijke instantie in de belastingrechtspraak. 
2005.03 Koen Caminada and Kees Goudswaard 
Budgetary costs of tax facilities for pension savings: an empirical analysis. 
2005.02 Henk Vording en Allard Lubbers 
How to limit the budgetary impact of the European Court's tax decisions? 
2005.01 Guido Suurmond en Ben van Velthoven 
Een beginselplicht tot handhaving: liever regels dan discretionaire vrijheid. 
2004.04 Ben van Velthoven en Marijke ter Voert 
Paths to Justice in the Netherlands. Looking for signs of social exclusion. 
2004.03 Guido Suurmond 
Brandveiligheid in de horeca. Een economische analyse van de handhaving in een  
representatieve gemeente. 
2004.02 Kees Goudswaard, Koen Caminada en Henk Vording 
Naar een transparanter loonstrookje? 
2004.01 Koen Caminada and Kees Goudswaard 
Are public and private social expenditures complementary? 
2003.01 Joop de Kort 
De mythe van de globalisering. Mondialisering, regionalisering of gewoon internationale 
economie? 
2002.04 Koen Caminada en Kees Goudswaard 
Inkomensgevolgen van veranderingen in de arbeidsongeschiktheidsregelingen en het  
nabestaandenpensioen. 
2002.03 Kees Goudswaard 
Houdbare solidariteit. 
2002.02 Ben van Velthoven 
Civiele en administratieve rechtspleging in Nederland 1951-2000; deel 1: tijdreeksanalyse. 
2002.01 Ben van Velthoven 
Civiele en administratieve rechtspleging in Nederland 1951-2000; deel 2: tijdreeksdata.  
2001.03 Koen Caminada and Kees Goudswaard 
International Trends in Income Inequality and Social Policy. 
2001.02 Peter Cornelisse and Kees Goudswaard 
On the Convergence of Social Protection Systems in the European Union. 
 
